GREEN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LTD
Company number NI072042 · Monitor this company
This analysis was written by an AI from the company's public filings. It may contain errors or omissions and is not financial or professional advice.
Financial Health Assessment: GREEN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LTD
1. Financial Health Score: F (Terminal)
This company receives the lowest possible grade. The patient has, unfortunately, not survived—GREEN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LTD is now dissolved and its final financial statements revealed a business in critical insolvency. Like a patient presenting with catastrophic organ failure, the financial vitals in the final year showed a business that had suffered a severe and ultimately fatal financial event.
2. Key Vital Signs
| Vital Sign | 2017 (Final Year) | 2016 | Change | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | £117,032 | £572,513 | ▼ 79.6% | Massive hemorrhage of assets |
| Fixed Assets | £2,998 | £39,248 | ▼ 92.4% | Near-total loss of long-term assets |
| Current Assets | £114,034 | £533,265 | ▼ 78.6% | Severe liquidity depletion |
| Current Liabilities | £193,448 | £487,147 | ▼ 60.3% | Reduced, but still exceed assets |
| Net Current Assets | (£79,414) | £46,118 | ▼ 272.2% | Working capital critically negative |
| Net Assets | (£76,416) | £61,745 | ▼ 223.7% | Insolvent—liabilities exceed assets |
| Shareholders' Funds | (£76,416) | £61,745 | ▼ 223.7% | Equity completely wiped out |
Long-term Financial Trajectory
| Year | Net Assets | Trend |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | (£3,789) | ❌ Insolvent at birth |
| 2012 | (£1,706) | ⚠️ Still insolvent |
| 2013 | £6,891 | ✅ Barely positive |
| 2014 | £54,558 | ✅ Strong growth |
| 2015 | £40,041 | ⚠️ Declining |
| 2016 | £61,745 | ✅ Recovered |
| 2017 | (£76,416) | ❌ Catastrophic collapse |
3. Diagnosis
Severe Financial Insolvency with Fatal Asset Hemorrhage
The clinical picture is one of sudden cardiac arrest in a patient with a history of cardiac vulnerability.
Symptoms Identified:
1. Chronic Insolvency Risk (Pre-existing Condition) The company was born with a weak financial heart—insolvent in 2011 and 2012 with negative net assets. While it appeared to recover during 2013-2016, this was a fragile remission rather than a cure.
2. Catastrophic Asset Collapse (Acute Event) Between 2016 and 2017, total assets fell by £455,481 (79.6%). This is the financial equivalent of massive blood loss. The near-total disappearance of fixed assets (down 92.4%) suggests either: - Write-off of impaired or worthless assets - Disposal of assets at significant loss - Potential asset stripping before dissolution
3. Working Capital Failure (Organ Failure) Net current assets swung from +£46,118 to -£79,414—a £125,532 deterioration. The company could not meet its short-term obligations from current resources. This is the financial equivalent of kidney failure—the business could not filter and process its financial flows.
4. Equity Wipeout (Systemic Collapse) Shareholders' funds went from £61,745 to negative £76,416—a £138,161 swing that eliminated all shareholder value and created a deep deficit. The company owed 165p for every £1 of assets it owned.
5. Cash Reservoir Depletion While cash data isn't available for 2017, the historical pattern shows cash declined from a peak of £228,345 (2013) to £65,238 (2014) and £64,201 (2015)—a 72% drain over two years before the final collapse.
6. Disappearance of Long-term Creditors Creditors due after more than one year dropped from £23,621 to zero, while secured debts fell from £5,125 to zero. This suggests debts were either called in or converted to short-term obligations—creditors lost confidence and demanded payment.
Root Cause Analysis:
Despite its name suggesting "green energy," the company's SIC code (81229) classifies it as a building and industrial cleaning business. This industry is: - Highly competitive with low margins - Vulnerable to economic downturns - Cash-flow sensitive with significant debtor risk
The company likely suffered from: - Loss of major contracts (explaining the asset and revenue collapse) - Bad debts (debtors written off, explaining current asset drop) - Over-leveraged position (liabilities remained high while assets evaporated) - Potential director-related issues (given the ultimate dissolution)
4. Prognosis
Deceased — No Recovery Possible
The company is dissolved. This is the corporate equivalent of death—there is no path to recovery. The dissolution date of 07 August 2026 appears to be an administrative date, but the company's operational life ended with its final accounts showing insolvency.
Lessons from the Post-Mortem:
| Warning Sign | When It Appeared | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Initial insolvency | 2011-2012 | Company was undercapitalized from start |
| Thin equity base | 2013 (only £6,891 net assets on £419k assets) | Over-reliant on debt; fragile structure |
| Cash decline from 2013 | 2013-2015 | Cash halved over two years—silent symptom |
| Asset quality concerns | 2016 (£39k fixed assets on £572k total) | 93% of assets were current—potentially illiquid debtors |
| Sudden collapse | 2017 | Terminal event |
5. Recommendations
Note: These recommendations are academic, as the company no longer exists, but serve as lessons for similar businesses.
For Stakeholders of Similar Companies:
1. Monitor Working Capital Health Regularly - Track the current ratio (current assets ÷ current liabilities) quarterly - This company's ratio went from 1.09 (2016) to 0.59 (2017)—below 1.0 is a critical warning sign - Prescription: Maintain a minimum current ratio of 1.5 for cleaning businesses
2. Watch for Chronic Insolvency Patterns - Companies that start insolvent or become insolvent multiple times carry relapse risk - Each recovery masks underlying structural weakness - Prescription: Require equity injections to build genuine resilience, not just debt restructuring
3. Diversify Revenue Concentration - The speed of collapse suggests over-reliance on limited contracts - Prescription: No single customer should represent more than 20% of revenue
4. Strengthen Cash Reserves - Cash declined 72% from 2013-2015 before the fatal year - Prescription: Maintain minimum 3 months of operating expenses in accessible cash
5. Director Due Diligence - The PSC register shows Mr John Martin owns 25-50% of shares - Directors should ensure they understand fiduciary duties, especially when approaching insolvency - Prescription: Seek professional advice at the first sign of financial distress—early intervention saves businesses